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Magazine       "Oasis"
Year
№ 20 (64) October 2007
№ 19 (63) October 2007
No. 18 (62) September 2007
№ 17 (61) September 2007
No 16 (60) August 2007
15 (59) August 2007
№ 14 (58) July 2007
№ 13 (57) July 2007
№ 12 (56) June 2007
№ 11 (55) June 2007
No 10 (54) May 2007
No 9 (53) May 2007
№ 8 (52) April 2007
№ 7 (51) April 2007
No. 6 (50) March 2007
No. 5 (49) March 2007
№ 4 (48) February 2007
№ 3 (47) February 2007
№ 2 (46) January 2007
№ 1 (45) January 2007
THE AUTHORS
Subscribe
on       journal [PDF]:
Oleg Panfilov,
project Manager,
panfilov[at]cjes.ru

Dmitry Alyaev,
chief editor,
alyaev[at]cjes.ru

Roman Zyuzin,
webmaster,
webmaster [at] cjes.ru

Adil Dzhalilov,
Kazakhstan,
adild[at]list.ru

a diamond stylus,
Kyrgyzstan,
citizen2005[at]yandex.ru

Nargis Zokirova,
Tajikistan
zokirova77 [at] mail.ru

Representative Names
in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
not disclosed

Lyudmila Burenkova,
technical editor,
lyuda [at] cjes.ru

Elena Dorokhova,
design,
inwork[at]frw.ru
Designers "stability"
Anvar Salihanov (Tashkent)
According to local analysts, the first reaction of official Tashkent to events in Kyrgyzstan was rather nervous, since Uzbekistan had already lost by that time the perception of itself in the regional arena as an independent and serious player and was turned by the international community almost into a rogue state. In order to avoid undesirable consequences emanating from such a situation and to exclude events like Kyrgyz in its territory, Tashkent took a number, in his opinion, of important actions. So, for example, it is no longer a secret to anyone that a whole “army” has been working in Kyrgyzstan from a certain time, consisting of Uzbek security forces, whose main task is to prevent the penetration of Kyrgyz euphoria into Uzbekistan.

Having solved this top-priority problem, Tashkent took a number of measures already inside the country. The following measures were to completely divert the local people from the events in Kyrgyzstan. And to some extent this was accomplished.

A person who knows the Uzbek mentality (which Islam Karimov places almost at the center of his statehood) is aware that every Uzbek lives as sacred to him as a duty. That is, to raise a child, to provide a family with housing, to help children create a family and to provide them with financial assistance in the first days of entering into the life independent of their parents. Today, in the conditions in which Uzbekistan is located and in which its government has put, it is not so easy to fulfill these obligations. Creating just such more severe conditions of existence allowed official Tashkent to achieve the expected result. The Uzbek who had gone headlong into his problems could no longer pay attention and monitor what was happening with the neighbors. Including that information about the Kyrgyz events did not pass through witnesses, Tashkent began to “restore order to the territory bordering on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border,“ cleaning ”it from any“ undesirable ”element.

At one time, the Kyrgyz markets, piled with Chinese and Turkish consumer goods, allowed ordinary Uzbeks to engage in the so-called shuttle business. “Tidying up” in the border areas made these opportunities difficult. But at the same time, Tashkent understood that excessive tightening may cause undesirable consequences. And it was for this reason that the decision was made to raise the issue of a visa-free agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. With this agreement, Tashkent killed two birds with one stone. Firstly, he suggested to the simple Uzbek that the state is allegedly trying to create conditions for him to freely cross the border into Kyrgyzstan and thereby won a point in his favor, and secondly, he created conditions for controlling shuttle traders in order to the latter were not too rich.

The adopted agreements within the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are also a great benefit for Tashkent. Among these agreements, in which Kyrgyzstan participated, were agreements on reciprocal measures to combat terrorism, extremism and separatism, agreements on the extradition of persons suspected of "crimes" hiding in neighboring countries. These agreements, the execution of which is mandatory for the signatory countries, made it possible for Tashkent to breathe more freely, as it allowed it to demand from Bishkek, for example, the very Andijan refugees, which, if desired, can be described as “extremists” (with the tacit consent of Russia , of course, the new "dear friend" of Uzbekistan).

Having such opportunities for self-defense, Tashkent ceased to be nervous. Moreover, the rules for issuing exit visas for citizens of Uzbekistan have been tightened. According to unofficial data, a special card file was created for persons who were prohibited from issuing visas under any pretext. In this way, Tashkent achieved the elimination of any contact of the citizens of Uzbekistan with undesirable foreign organizations expelled from the territory of the country and settled in the neighboring countries of the region.

The next very important step was the adoption by Tashkent of the decision on the “correction” of the news reports about Uzbekistan. According to a source close to the government circles, it was for these purposes that an impressive amount was allocated. The most popular and widely known among the population of the country were identified in the media, in which, according to a specially developed plan, the necessary “employees” were introduced and new media were formed in which goals were the misinformation of the world community (“Uzbekistan Today”, for example). As a result of these measures, distorted information about a country that was misleading the world community began to appear in many already international publications. And those media outlets that still had their sources in Uzbekistan were subjected to all-round oppression, and their employees were subject to criminal or administrative liability. Regarding especially active independent journalists, provocations were organized, which most often took the form of the so-called “black PR”. They practiced bullying on the phone and so on. Unable to withstand the stress, many journalists quickly left the country. Thus, Tashkent has achieved complete or rather partial elimination of leakage of truthful information from the country.

International non-governmental organizations, whose missions, according to the official authorities of Uzbekistan, presented a serious danger to the stability of the country, were also targeted. Under various pretexts, contacts were established between these organizations and the so-called “activists” of Uzbekistan, with the result that all the activities of international organizations came under serious control by security forces.

According to independent observers, all measures taken have become a guarantee for the Uzbek authorities that the Kyrgyz events will no longer be able to migrate to Uzbekistan. For those who are busy with their immediate problems and finally scared by the result of the dispersal of the rally in Andijan in 2005, the people of Uzbekistan will push the very idea of ​​a possible exit demanding the resignation of the government or the president of the country. The limited and strictly controlled travel of citizens abroad will not allow international organizations to fully use their capabilities to achieve their goals. And those who are still allowed to travel abroad and participate in seminars and conferences of these various international organizations will carry out a completely different mission, very different “organizations”.

Of course, to say that Tashkent has fully achieved its goal, and now it can not be completely calm. Since social changes have taken place in Kyrgyzstan with the subsequent transition of these democratic changes to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan can still become the outcast to which the finger will be pointed out and from the image of which he has been trying to dissociate himself in recent years. That is why, according to independent experts, Uzbekistan, using the influence of Russia on these countries, sharply raises the question of reanimation and reforming of the CIS (an ardent opponent of what it was before the Andijan events). At the same time, special emphasis will be placed on such important, in Tashkent's opinion, aspects as the struggle against “new challenges of modernity”. What this Tashkent means by the very struggle with “new challenges” is understood by everyone.
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