Recently, the rhetoric of the current leaders of France about the so-called. The Iranian nuclear dossier is becoming more militant. More recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, Bernard Kouchner, responding to questions from journalists, spoke out quite definitely on this topic. If you call a spade a spade, then the essence of his statement actually comes down to a hard actualization of the possibility of the initiation of the war against Iran by France and other Western countries.
The statement of the French minister caused an extremely negative reaction in Iran, which is quite understandable and natural. But Iran’s neighbors in the region, as well as virtually the entire “non-Western” world, including Russia and China, also did not remain indifferent. They also expressed their unequivocally negative attitude to the apparent desire of present-day France to actively contribute to exacerbating the situation around Iran. Faced with such a reaction by a large part of the international community, the French leadership, through the mouth of its prime minister, tried to demonstrate its intention to play back a little. Yes, and Bernard Kouchner himself tried to give a less belligerent interpretation of his words.
But ... the deed has already been done - the position is declared. The words of Bernard Kouchner, in the form in which the media brought them to the public, coupled with no less harsh statements by his boss, the head of the French state, including in his speech at the current session of the UN General Assembly, cannot but lead to the conclusion France Nicolas Sarkozy on a hike gathered.
Against one of the largest countries in the Muslim world. For the first time after participating in the tripartite aggression against Egypt in October 1956, which ended with its political defeat. Forced and far from peaceful withdrawal from most of the Maghreb in the second half of the 50s (just recall the slaughter that the French military staged in the Tunisian port of Bizerte) and the military-political defeat in the war with the people of Algeria, who rose to fight for national liberation. And today, France not only speaks hard about the possibility of war with a Muslim country, but also claims, as is evident from its heightened activity in the entire bustle around the Iranian nuclear dossier and, as it was half a century ago, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt, not just equal, but also an active initiator of the military campaign.
The militant position of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, and, consequently, of all those who voted for him during the last presidential elections in this country, with regard to Iran, her readiness to be close to the leading Western states in their opposition and resistance to the desire of Iranians to achieve a level of scientific and technical development comparable to the European one caused some confusion among many. After all, since the days of President Charles de Gaulle, France enjoyed the reputation of a country that has its own opinion, not identical to the views of the United States and their other, less independent, Western allies, on the Muslim world and its problems, adheres to a more objective and balanced position in relations with Muslim countries. France’s resolute refusal in 2003 to support the United States in their desire to start a war against Iraq under the far-fetched pretext further strengthened this reputation.
At the same time, the toughness shown by French politicians in relation to Iran in the international arena is a direct consequence of the country's withdrawal from a balanced and independent course towards Muslim countries as a whole. In many ways, this withdrawal is due to the overcoming of the consequences of the defeat of their country in the colonial wars of the 40s-50s, first in Indochina and then in Algeria, by French society. During the time of President de Gaulle and a little later in France, they still well remembered what big problems for the country and its citizens were these unsuccessful wars and defeats. The Fifth Republic itself became the product of the deepest socio-political crisis caused, including by these wars and defeats in them, as well as excessive adherence to Atlantic solidarity. And it is far from coincidence that it was de Gol that put an end to the French war against the Algerians, distanced itself from the USA, put forward the doctrine of “defense in all azimuths”, put at the forefront of its domestic and foreign policy, first of all, the protection of national interests, the revival of independence and the greatness of France, which she managed to incite following in the wake of the US-English Atlantis.
However, after the departure of de Gaulle from the political scene and from life, France began to gradually drift in the opposite direction. And with each successive president, this drift became more visible. At the time of the late Chirac, approximately from the end of 2003, it gained greater depth and stability, a particular manifestation of which was, for example, its tough and close to the American anti-Syrian position. Under Sarkozy, the revision of nakedism with formal golista reached its apogee and between atlantism, with its anti-Islamic twists, and the national interests of France, an equal sign was put.
This evolution of France directly contributed to the fact that for half a century that passed after its departure from the battles from its former Muslim colonies, two generations of French were born and grew up in the country, for which the previous wars are nothing more than a legend of antiquity and foreign experience. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the indignation of the environment caused by the growth and strengthening of the position of Muslims in the country, one after another waves of migration from the Maghreb countries, other Muslim countries, and Iran, together with Afghanistan, also contributed to this.
The growing militancy of the new France poses not simple questions for Tajikistan. In particular, this is how to be, against the background of the growing anti-Iranism of the leaders of this country, with the aircraft of the French Air Force and the French military contingent based in the airport of Dushanbe. After all, they appeared there in the presidency of Jacques Chirac, in which any military actions against Iran were simply unthinkable, fundamentally impossible. Under the new French president, such a prospect no longer seems impossible. And will it not happen that French aircraft and military, based in Dushanbe, will be involved in military actions against Iran directly from the territory of Tajikistan. And are there any real guarantees that this will not happen? If earlier this presence could be considered as a factor in ensuring the security of Tajikistan, then in the new conditions is it not possible to turn the French military presence in the republic into its opposite?
Anyway, the problem exists. Therefore, all the advantages and disadvantages for Tajikistan of further French military presence should be carefully weighed in the conditions of the growing deterioration of France’s attitude to Iran and the prospects for its very possible participation in anti-Iranian military actions.
Today for Tajikistan, the economic component should become prevalent in relations with foreign countries. In other words, the priority should be relations with those countries, cooperation with which not only brings political, but also economic benefits. Thus, for example, it is obvious that relations with the United States are useful, primarily from a political and, to a certain extent, economic points of view, because of their great influence on decision-making in such international financial institutions as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, IMF. The development of diverse relations with the United States is today a factor contributing to the consolidation of the country's political independence. Naturally, exactly to the extent that they are at the level of sufficiency and are not redundant. In particular, the absence of the US military presence in the republic contributes to maintaining relations between Tajikistan and the United States at the level of sufficiency.
As for relations with Iran, they are extremely important for Tajikistan, primarily in economic terms. Today, Iran is implementing a number of strategically significant projects for the republic, such as the construction of the Sangtuda hydroelectric station, the Anzob tunnel connecting the south, the center and the north of Tajikistan, the Chormagzak tunnel to the south, the design of the tractor factory. Trade relations between the two countries related by language, culture and religion are actively developing.
There are no such economic beneficial relations between Tajikistan and France, and they are not foreseen in the near future. And the political dividends from the development of Tajik-French relations do not look as significant today as in the presidency of Jacques Chirac, for as France becomes more and more poro-Atlantic and pro-American, it loses its attractiveness as an independent political force in the international arena. Finally, if the initiatives of the Afghan leadership and the United States behind it, aimed at launching a negotiation process with the Taliban, are transformed into a stable political course, into an active inter-Afghan peaceful political dialogue, then the continued presence of the French contingent in Dushanbe, especially if the militant sentiments of the new French leaders regarding Iran will not decline, will become redundant. Moreover, it will not be beneficial for Tajikistan from both the economic, political and military points of view.
When the French military arrived in the republic, there was only France. Today, France is different. As indeed, today Tajikistan has become different. Accordingly, relations between the two countries can no longer remain as they were at the time when the first aircraft of the French Air Force landed at the Dushanbe airport. One way or another, they must change and reflect new realities.